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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the Palestinian use of incendiary kites and balloons that emerged during 
Gaza’s Great March of Return. Kites and balloons are rarely thought of as unstoppable weapons in 
contemporary theatres of war and resistance. Yet, for an extended period the Israeli military was unable to 
halt these aerial explosives from burning large quantities of agricultural fields and natural forests 
surrounding the Gaza Strip. The article critiques the security literature that discusses this new method of 
Palestinian resistance as another instance of terrorism. Instead, by drawing on Palestinian and Fanonian 
theorisations of violence in anti-colonial movements, I attempt to make the kites and balloons legible as a 
form of indigenous resistance to settler colonialism that can be an internally mobilising tool for Palestinians. 
The paper argues that the low-tech aerial explosives were mobilised as a response to high-tech militarism 
and long-standing settler colonial processes still shaping dynamics on the ground. These innovative forms of 
resistance momentarily broke the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip and in burning trees planted to cover 
destroyed Palestinian villages open up questions surrounding the struggle over land in Israel/Palestine. The 
paper concludes by delineating how despite some immediate breakthroughs, it remains questionable 
whether these militant kites and balloons are long-term politically viable techniques of resistance. 
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The grassroots political mobilisation that emerged in the Gaza Strip, known as the Great March of Return 
(GMR), constitutes one of the largest Palestinian uprisings in recent history and has received significant 
media attention, mostly due to Israel’s military repression. Since March 30 20181, Israel’s military has killed 
214 Palestinians and injured over 36,000 during the popular mobilisations that took place weekly until 
November 2019 (OCHA 2020). During the same period, a Palestinian fighter killed one Israeli soldier, while 
no Israeli civilian was killed. The Great March of Return organisers sought to avoid the use of violence and 
the protest was explicitly framed as a “peaceful” endeavour. The vast majority of participants assembled 
unarmed near the fence separating Gaza from Israel and protested nonviolently. Yet, after the first day of the 
GMR, other methods of resistance emerged. Activists began cutting and breaking into the fence enclosing 
the Gaza Strip, burning tyres, throwing rocks, and, most notably, flying incendiary devices. In particular, 
burning kites and balloons are the case study employed here to investigate a novel insurgent technique of 
resistance in Israel/Palestine.2 Although the fires did not result in any fatality on the Israeli side, for an 
extended period the Israeli military was unable to stop the launching of incendiary objects, which caused by 
December 2018 more than 2,000 fires inside Israel setting ablaze almost 8,000 acres (over 35 square 
kilometres) of largely agricultural fields and natural forests (Rinat 2018).  
In emphasising the historicity and specificity of the case, the article weaves through an analysis of 
indigenous resistance to settler colonialism. Scholars increasingly see Zionism as a European settler colonial 
movement, which “subjects Palestine and Palestinians to structural and violent forms of dispossession, land 
appropriation, and erasure in the pursuit of a new   Jewish   state   and   society” (Jabary Salamanca et al. 
2012, 1).  By upholding the notion of settler colonialism to understand the situation on the ground means “to 
historicize the colonisation of Palestine as a process that began long before the 1948 Nakba” (Bhandar and 
Ziadah 2016). This frame also turns the analysis away from the binary of “Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” which 
is representative of a “Zionist hegemonic” narrative (de Jong 2017). The shifting of the perspective towards 
settler colonialism has been defined as a “settler colonial turn” (Busbridge 2017) in Palestine Studies, and 
has enabled a counter-interpretation of the temporal-spatial framework of the struggle. However, while the 
academic turn may have been recent there is a longer trajectory of Palestinian and other scholars adopting 
this frame (Sayegh 1965, Kanafani 1972, 36). While the mainstream framework of reference is played out 
solely in the lands Israel invaded in 1967 – what is known as the occupied Palestinian territories - settler 
colonialism allows for a broader analysis in terms of the temporal arc and in terms of the political 
implications of such an analysis. Yet, Barakat (2018) warns against using the settler colonial lens without 
situating Palestinians as active agents. As she suggests, we should centre indigenous voices and resistance, 
so that an indigenous reading of settler colonialism – one which does not necessarily overlap with the 
academic interpretations of it - is brought about (Ibid, 360).  Lastly, there is a history of Palestinian literature 
specifically adopting a settler colonial frame while theorising anti-colonial resistance to Zionism and 
imperialism (Fateh 1967), which this paper will draw on. 
 
1  On this day Palestinians commemorate Land Day. See interview with activist-priest Fr. Shehadeh Shehadeh, who headed 
the first protest in 1976 (Adalah 2005). 
2 This was the first recorded systematic use of incendiary kites and balloons as a weapon in Israel/Palestine. For past 
comparative examples see the Fu-Go balloon bomb deployed by Japan against the United States during World War Two 









Recent scholarship analysed the Great March of Return from the organisers’ perspective (Abusalim 2018) 
and focused on the class composition of the protesters (Baker 2019). Other studies analysed the protests’ 
repression through Israel’s sovereign “right to kill” (Erakat 2019), the “right to maim” (Puar and Abu Sitta 
2019), and as an opportunity for high-tech innovation (Dana 2020). The majority of literature that covers in-
depth the incendiary devices uncritically adopt Israel’s dominant narrative and provides knowledge that 
justifies the use of state violence (Zych 2019; Khen 2019; Yarchi and Ayalon 2020). This narrative relies on 
what Edward Said (1978) termed Orientalist language, whereby Arab societies are portrayed as an “Oriental” 
race not equal to the West. In this way racialized language frames Palestinian resistance as “terrorism,” 
therefore an illegitimate response. As Abdo shows, racist Orientalist ideology constructs “a new 
epistemology for perceiving the Middle Eastern people, the Muslim, the Arab and specially the Palestinian” 
(2014, 4) as inferior to Europeans and the West. Crucially, to use Gramscian language, this hegemonic 
narrative provides ahistorical depictions of anti-colonial struggles for liberation as “terrorism” to legitimate 
the repressive violence of the state.  
There are some exceptions, however. Keysar (2020) briefly explores kites and balloons as “aerial 
resistance” within the context of do-it-yourself (DIY) techniques. Kamil (2019) provides extensive analysis 
of the use of incendiary kites and balloons. She is the only scholar to historicize this tactic as a form of low-
tech weaponry within the history of warfare. This article builds on that scholarship but differs in a number of 
ways. Kamil analyses incendiary kites and balloons as media objects and examines their digital 
representations “within the context of technological development in Palestine and Israel” (2019, 137). 
Instead of focusing on the aspects of this form of resistance as media, this article centres on the motivations 
of Palestinians engaged in launching kites and balloons, which in Kamil are side-lined. Furthermore, it 
concentrates on their emergence as a resistance tactic within the Great March of Return movement and their 
material impact for Palestinians and the Israeli side.  
The research question addressed here is: what explains the mobilisation of this particular type of 
resistance? The paper argues that incendiary kites and balloons are a response to settler colonial violence that 
can be liberating for the individual. After a brief history of the rise and repression of the Great March of 
Return (section 2), it attempts to theorise incendiary aerial devices building on Palestinian and Fanonian 
notions of anti-colonial resistance (section 3). Despite some of its limitations, the settler colonial 
violence/violent anti-colonial resistance dialectic can help understanding the appearance of these aerial 
explosives. Specifically, the way revolutionary violence can help “free Arab consciousness from the complex 
of deficiency” (Fateh 1967, 15) and reclaim humanity (Fanon 1965) is visible in the motivations for 
launching the incendiary devices (section 4). The innovation in mobilisations against high-tech militarism 
through the low-tech character of kites and balloons have permitted Palestinians to momentarily break the 
blockade (section 5). They have also for a short time made Israeli settlers pay a small price for occupying 
Palestinian land, and in burning trees planted to cover destroyed Palestinian villages that were depopulated in 
1948 they revealed the ruins still present on the land (section 6). In the Conclusion, it is further elaborated on 
why it remains uncertain that incendiary kites and balloons can be a long-term viable technique of struggle. 
These innovative forms of resistance only posed a limited challenge since the vast military superiority of the 
opponent is very difficult to threaten and the Israeli state has compensated farmers for their losses (Heller 
2018).  
To address the research question, the analysis draws on the following methodological tools: a theoretical 
discussion to bring into conversation the use of incendiary devices with Palestinian notions of anti-colonial 
resistance as well as with the work of Fanon; a critique of existing academic literature on the use of kites and 
balloons during the protests; and testimonies of Palestinian protesters and information on the incendiary 








were conducted over the phone through WhatsApp with organisers of the GMR which provided information 
on the reasons and motivations for launching incendiary kites and balloons that further informed the 
analysis.3  
Before proceeding a note is in order regarding the contradictory interpretations of what incendiary kites 
and balloons represent. Are the incendiary kites and balloons a form of violence or nonviolence? Brokhill 
and Cordell suggest violence remains a very contested concept in social science and situate the scholarly 
debate as revolving around “the question of whether the concept of violence should be defined narrowly, and 
limited to physical attack – violence as force, or whether it should be extended to a broader definition – 
violence as violation” (2019, 983). If we take the more conservative definition that narrowly defines violence 
equating it with force and “define the concept as the exercise of physical force” (Ibid), the incendiary kites 
and balloons can and have had that type of effect. In critical academic literature such as Kamil (2019, 137), 
they are identified as a form of violent resistance.  
However, Palestinian views differ on the interpretation. While some Palestinians recognize that the use of 
incendiary devices can be a form of violence that causes suffering to the other side (see p.7), others maintain 
that their actions were “peaceful.” From an interview with a GRM participant it emerged that some 
Palestinians want to distinguish between the violence of the Israeli state and their own responses, which, in 
their view, should not be appraised in the same terms.4 The interviewee pointed to the importance of 
asserting that the kites and balloons’ violence level is of a lesser form compared to that of rockets, for 
instance, and that they are not intended to kill people. Indeed, the fact no Israeli has been significantly 
injured or killed confirms the intention to not lethally target people. At the same time, others still recognize 
this type of resistance tries “to hurt or inconvenience Israel, however little” (Abu Eltarabesh 2021). A quote 
from a protester launching incendiary devices and claiming they are a peaceful tactic points to rather a 
deliberate calibration of violence that remains nonlethal, “Even if they cause damage to lands already taken 
by force from Palestinians, the kites are still a symbol of peace and freedom. At least they do not target or 
kill anyone and we are not aiming at this” (Husseini 2018). This framing is reminiscent of the African 
National Congress (ANC) sabotage campaign launched in the 1960s, where home-made bombs were 
deployed in deliberate non-lethal attacks against symbols of apartheid in South Africa (Stevens 2019, 240). 
By emphasising the existence of different types of political violence, this article suggests that without 
appraising this form of resistance with its violent ramifications misses a key element to explain the reasons 
for its mobilisation. While the reading I give of the incendiary kites and balloons builds on the narratives and 
motivations of protesters, it diverges from how some perceive this practice. In doing so, as Bargu describes 
in relation to a study on insurgent resistance to state violence, this divergence allows us “to analyse 
resistance beyond how that resistance presents itself to itself, to its supporters and opponents, and the public 





3 The analysis also draws on twenty-seven semi-structured interviews conducted between April and June 2018, collected with 
participants of the GRM, some of which were injured by the Israeli army. Some interviews were conducted in collaboration 
with researchers in Gaza, while others through Skype from London. It is quoted only one interview that discusses the reasons 
for launching kites and balloons, while the other interviews have provided valuable insight on the participants’ experience of 
military violence during the protests. These interviews were submitted as evidence to the 2018 UN Commission of Inquiry 
into the protests.  








2. A brief history of the rise and repression of the Great March of Return 
 
Before turning to the role of incendiary kites and balloons, it is necessary to contextualize the ways in 
which the Great March of Return materialized. Abusalim (2018) argues that the 2011 revolutionary change 
that the Arab uprisings ignited was a major turning point in the consciousness of the GRM’s organisers. He 
also suggests that many aspects of the regional uprisings inspired Palestinian mobilisation efforts. Another 
important driver for the mobilisation was the fact that the majority of Gaza’s population consists of refugees 
whose dispossessed homes and lands are located inside Israel. The core of this movement can be described 
as the “Oslo generation.” These are young people under the age of thirty who grew up in Gaza during the 
“Peace Process” years (post-1993). They never left the Strip because of the Israeli siege and have limited 
opportunities for a decent life. Alongside economic considerations, it is also important to note that after the 
1993 Oslo Accords, Palestinian refugees’ demands were marginalized in the political arena. In this regard, 
the main strategy of the GMR consisted in the construction of so-called Camps of Return: tents symbolising 
the displacement of the Palestinian nation since the creation of Israel in 1948. Thus, they also mobilised 
around the question of return, the idea of “marching” and the mobility of a people intent on reclaiming 
dispossessed homes and lands. The more mundane Palestinian resistance tactic known as sumud (staying put) 
here cannot seemingly serve the cause; rootedness is not the value that demands protection. This 
contextualisation helps situating the emergence of incendiary kites and balloons as a tactic integral to the 
demands of the GRM, which centred on the right of return and ending the siege. 
To understand the emergence of this form of resistance is required to position it within the ongoing settler 
colonial violence imposed on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip before and during the Great March of Return. 
Similarly to other counter-revolutionary forces in the region operating since 2010, the Israeli state employed 
large-scale violence to repress GRM demonstrations. On the first day of the GRM, an estimated 30,000–
45,000 people participated peacefully. On the same day, Israeli snipers shot dead 17 Palestinians and injured 
some 1,400 others. The repression was deployed through legal and discursive technologies to legitimate 
violence such as the “terrorist,” “human shields” (Gordon and Perugini 2018), and the “infiltrator” threats, 
with which the Israeli state has historically criminalized refugees attempting to return to their lands and 
properties (Shalhub-Kevorkian 2016).  
Further, in discussing the shoot-to-kill policy of the military during the protests, Erakat shows how the 
“securitization of Palestinian natives reflects a settler anxiety that has equated its settler sovereignty with a 
Jewish demographic balance and has driven a policy of racial purity” (2019, 795). In pointing to the 
racialization of Palestinians, Erakat also captures the refusal of the Israeli state to use assimilation policies as 
a settler colonial logic, thus exposing Israel’s need to maintain natives in Gaza segregated and 
geographically contained. Strikingly, in the first nine months of the protests, over 80 percent of the 6,106 
protesters wounded were shot in the lower limbs by Israeli soldiers (Akkad 2019). Building on Puar’s work, 
we can assert that Palestinian protesters threatened the settler colonial order and therefore were regularly 
injured and maimed in what she terms “the sovereign right to maim” (2017), unsettling the binary between 
biopolitics and necropolitics, and exposing Israel’s ongoing settler colonial violence. Without this 
scholarship situating Israeli colonial domination, the reactions of protesters may be seen as unjustified.  
 
3. Theorising anti-colonial resistance to settler colonialism 
 
Palestinians’ use of violent and nonviolent resistance is certainly not new and has historically been used 
against colonial and settler colonial violence. Palestinian resistance to Zionist colonialism began in the 1880s 








the recent rise of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement to the first calls for boycotts 
against Zionist settlers emerging between 1910 and World War One (2019, 60). The subsequent Palestinian 
revolt (1936-39) against British colonialism facilitating Zionist settlement in Palestine featured forms of 
violent resistance including incidences of arson, and direct attacks on Jewish settlers and their property 
(Nimr 1990, 43-55). The Palestinian thawra (revolution) launched in exile in the 1960s became known 
internationally for its use of armed struggle. Fanon’s notion of “revolutionary violence” and guerrilla warfare 
were central tools throughout the thawra, shaping the strategy of the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine and the entire liberation movement (PFLP 1970; Leopardi 2020, 17). The two Palestinian 
Intifadas (the uprisings of 1987-93 and 2000-05) saw Palestinians engaging in both violent and nonviolent 
acts of rebellion. The most prominent contemporary, though not the sole, actor deploying armed struggle 
against Israel is the de-facto governing authority in the Gaza Strip, Hamas. However, while violent resistance 
is no stranger to the Palestinian struggle for liberation, incendiary kites and balloons represent a significant 
novelty in such a history. 
Theoretically, to explain the use of incendiary kites and balloons during Gaza’s recent protest movement, 
the article introduces concepts developed by anti-colonial revolutionary Frantz Fanon, focusing in particular 
on his essay “Concerning Violence” from Wretched of the Earth (1965).  When people emerged in protest 
and defiance, the Gaza Strip was already a space of colonial oppression, which is a key feature in Fanon’s 
theorisation of the appearance of political violence in resistance. As Fanon identifies violence as the only 
modus operandi of colonialism, it becomes an omnipresent feature of daily life for the colonised (1965, 61). 
The violence of colonialism is totalizing, pervading the subject physically and is implemented through the 
structural violence of the colonial system, which enforces the “systematic negation” of the indigenous’ 
humanity (Ibid, 250). This causes a sense of shared injustice between colonial subjects, which can become a 
mobilising force (Ibid, 46). In acknowledging the constant violence imposed on indigenous people, Fanon 
suggests the inevitability to respond to oppression with forms of violent resistance. Yet, the use of force that 
Fanon speaks of is not an a priori justification for violence, but is a revolutionary violence that counters 
colonialism. As Said also notes, “violence cannot be enough and strategies of politics and reason must come 
into play”, arguing that there is a “need to balance violent force with an exigent political and organisational 
process” (1993, 284). 
A central element that we can discern from Fanon for our understanding of incendiary kites and balloons 
is the effect that resistance has on the colonised subject. Fanon paid particular attention to diagnosing the 
emotions and experiences of the native; specifically, the effects that anti-colonial violence produces. “At the 
level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force,” Fanon notes, “[i]t frees the native from his inferiority 
complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect” (1965, 74). 
For Fanon a violent struggle for decolonisation allows the colonised not only to reclaim their humanity, but 
also to recreate themselves. In this way, the cleansing element of violence can have cathartic power. In 
focusing on the cleansing potential of violence, Fanon emphasises the ways it is a response to the natural 
feeling of violent rage caused by the inhumanity of colonialism.  
Building on these concepts developed by Fanon, I draw on Palestinian theorisations of anti-colonial 
resistance to settler colonialism. In fact, as described by Nabulsi and Takriti (2016), Algeria’s Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) greatly inspired the Palestinian strategy during the thawra. Given that Fanon 
theorised in the context of Algeria, using Palestinian notions of anti-colonial resistance can more precisely 
ground the analysis. In a theoretical text produced by Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fateh) 
titled The Liberation of Occupied Countries and the Method of Struggle Against Direct Colonialism (1967) a 
clear vision for successful anti-colonial struggle is put forward. It theorises the conditions for “the liberation 








doing so it adopts a settler colonial frame, situating Palestine within similar settler colonial contexts such as 
Algeria, Rhodesia and South Africa (1967, 1). There are three ways that this text can further our 
understanding of the mobilisation of incendiary kites and balloons. First, the discussion provides an early 
recognition of how “in its subjugation of peoples, colonialism initially depends on military power, modern 
tools, and technological means” (Ibid). The text identifies the high-tech versus low-tech dichotomy when 
considering how anti-colonial wars of liberation “pit technologically and scientifically advanced forces of 
occupation possessing massive arsenals against the forces of the colonised people fighting with primitive old 
weapons and tiny resources” (1967, 7). Over half a century later this asymmetry is still dominant, and the 
mobilisation of incendiary kites and balloons show that they are a response to the asymmetry in power. For 
Fateh, however, the low-tech/high-tech disparity should induce a popular war of the masses. This is the 
second element that will be used to show the potential and also limitations of deploying incendiary kites and 
balloons. Here, Fateh’s theorisation established that “the war of the masses increases the anxiety, 
nervousness, and insecurity of the coloniser and ruins the aims underlying its presence such as exploiting the 
human and natural resources of the colonised country” (1967, 7). The launchers of incendiary kites and 
balloons had some of these intentions – to destabilize the coloniser’s rootedness on the land - and only 
briefly achieved that quest. Yet, the vast disparity between the armed struggle that Palestinians (and Fanon) 
discussed in the 1960s and the kites and balloons, along with the inability to mobilise a war of the masses are 
significant constraints that should not be overlooked. 
Lastly, the Fateh article diagnosed consciousness, at the individual and collective level, to have a central 
role for the liberation of colonised peoples. As it is stated, “the weakness of revolutionary consciousness or 
its complete absence amongst many colonised peoples aids the survival and consolidation of colonialism” 
(Fateh 1967, 2). It discusses the fear that permeates Palestinian consciousness and argues, “That is why fida’i 
operations have been launched, directly eliminating fear and curing the complexes of inadequacy and 
occupation” (Ibid)5. It is in this way that incendiary kites and balloons have the revolutionary potential to 
free native consciousness from fear and inadequacy, and provide an internally mobilising tool that is 
liberating for the individual. While noting the important limitations, I suggest building on Fanon and 
Palestinian theorisations of violent anti-colonial resistance can be a helpful frame to further understand this 
new phenomenon. 
 
4. “We want to burn the crops of settlers”: Articulating the launch of aerial 
explosives 
 
The use of incendiary devices tends to be commonly explained as an Orientalist depiction of terrorism, 
which in turn can serve to provide justification and legitimisation for state violence. Zych’s article (2019) 
situates their use as exclusively a Hamas tactic, therefore reducing them to terrorism. Zych’s reduction of 
Palestinian resistance to Hamas-led armed struggle denies agency to the youths who started this tactic and 
fails to account for their motivations. Although it should be noted that Hamas sought to control and influence 
the use of incendiary devices - as a UN Human Rights Council investigation, the Israeli media and military 
also recognized - this initiative was not something Hamas started because it emerged as an autonomous 
grassroots youth initiative (UNCOI 2019; Gross 2018). Zych also furthers a racialized discourse, which tends 
to cast only Arabs or Muslims as terrorists while state violence remains always rational, legal, and therefore 
legitimate. Khen’s (2019) work focused on the difficulty to categorize these new incendiary devices within 
 
5 Fida'i translates literally from Arabic to “one who sacrifices himself (for his country);” it is often translated in the English-








legal paradigms about the use of force in military operations. It is argued that Israel’s intervention vis-à-vis 
the kites and balloons should “be regulated by the concept of self-defense and escalation of force procedure” 
(2019, 303). Contrary to Zych, part of Khen’s reasoning for arguing that Israel should adopt a “self-defense” 
stance was the lack of evidence that this is an official Hamas operation, which prevents it from meeting the 
threshold for the applicability of an armed conflict paradigm (2020, 332). Yet, this appealing to international 
law’s notion of “self-defense” is untenable in Israel’s case, as is overwhelmingly acknowledged that it is still 
occupying the Gaza Strip despite its so-called “disengagement” from the area in 2005.6 Thus, Khen’s study is 
also problematic because it uncritically adopts Israel’s hegemonic and Orientalist narrative to advance 
knowledge that supports the implementation of state violence. Instead, a more nuanced appraisal is 
necessary, which offers an understanding of the motivations for indigenous resistance to settler colonialism. 
The voices highlighted below are from the first balloon and kite launchers operating between April 2018 
and March 2019, after which the launching was halted.7 In fact, in April 2018, on the second Friday of the 
GMR, groups of youths, claiming to be unaffiliated to political factions started to organise self-declared kites 
and balloons units (e.g. Ibna al Zouari/“Sons of Zouari”), aiming to break the aerial blockade and 
intentionally cause damage to Israeli property. The “Sons of Zouari” unit was named after the Tunisian 
engineer Mohammad Al Zouari, who was a member of Hamas’ military wing Al Qassam Brigade and was 
allegedly killed in an extrajudicial assassination by Israel in 2016 in Tunisia. The unit is inspired by Al 
Zouari’s method of resistance (“invasion by air”) because of his role in the 2014 conflict in Gaza during 
which he supervised the use of Ababeel 1, an unmanned aircraft. Testimonies of protesters wielding 
incendiary devices stated that they see themselves as implementing his vision through “a simplified mode of 
popular resistance” (UNCOI 2019, 118).   
While other organised activities during the protests such as the burning “tyre units” (“Kushuk units”) 
caused thick black smoke to protect protesters from sniper fire, the incendiary kite and balloon units have a 
clearer offensive dimension. These incendiary kites and balloons have been weaponised through simple and 
extremely cheap means. Kites can be handmade (mostly from household objects or with wood from palm 
trees, ropes, plastic and paper) while balloons, either the ones used for birthdays or latex contraceptives, are 
inflated using helium. Overall, with under 3 US$, a weapon can be constructed. Palestinians began using 
balloons because they are less visible to the Israeli military and fly for longer distances, deeper into Israel, 
sometimes for four to five kilometers. To ignite fire, kites and balloons have been laden with a metal pouch 
containing Molotov cocktails, grenades and flammable substances such as burning coal, coals wrapped in 
chicken wire, or rags soaked in oil and fuel. Some balloons ignite shortly after landing through an incense 
stick that burns a packet containing an inflammable substance, whereas some kites are lit through the tail 
before launching. The wind from the Mediterranean Sea allows the kites and balloons to float into the Israeli 
side of the fence and reach distant forests, crops and agricultural lands. The winds of the southern 
Naqab/Negev desert – which carry hot tropical air - fan the flames and allow for more widespread damage. 
In several cases, they also landed in empty educational institutions and in private houses, causing property 
damage (UNCOI 2019, 78). The aerial explosives may be intended to also target people, yet they have 
remained nonlethal, as no Israeli as been killed. 
From the discourses of those involved in launching the incendiary devices, it is possible to understand the 
reasons for taking on this specific action. Ahmed, 17-year-old, articulates in this way what drives him:  
 
6 See Erakat (2014) on the reasons why Israel cannot claim a right to self-defense in international law from actors operating in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 
7 Since then, they have reappeared sporadically and more systematically in August/September 2020, although outside of the 









We want to burn the crops of settlers. Every day they burn our hearts in killing the young and injuring 
them. They torture us. It is a simple act. We enjoy our time flying kites, and we make the Israelis suffer 
like us. They can put pressure on their government to make us live better (Eglash 2018).  
 
Rather than nonviolence, these tactics and discourse seemingly echo the settler-native dyad that Fanon 
(1965, 65) emphasised. As he highlights: 
 
He [the native] of whom they have never stopped saying that the only language he understands is that of 
force, decides to give utterance by force. In fact, as always, the settler has shown him the way he should 
take if he is to become free.  
 
Ahmed’s quote clearly emphasises the violence inflicted on protesters by Israel’s military during the 
protests and in response to this he calls for the need to target settlers’ properties. He defines Israel’s violence 
as a form of “torture” to describe the violence of Israeli snipers during the demonstrations. Rather than being 
a senseless use of force, his reaction to this violence shows the necessity to burn the harvest of Israelis living 
on the other side of the fence. In particular, Ahmed asserts a claim over dispossessed lands by explicitly 
using the word “settler” to characterize those living inside Israel in defiance of mainstream representations, 
which consider “settlers” only those Israelis inhabiting the territories occupied in 1967. This is also in line 
with the Great March of Return’s demand to return to lands and properties inside the Israeli state. 
A woman participating in the protests details the initial use of balloons (without inflammatory devices 
attached) as a symbolic action of resistance: “I also participated in protests each Tuesday, when we organised 
cultural national events and launched balloons with the names of Palestinian towns and villages that we were 
forced to flee.”8 Similarly, Warda al-Zebda, a 37-year-old woman who participated regularly in the protests, 
detailed how she felt free and connected to her original hometown now inside Israel when she flew the kites. 
She then explained how the same concept was eventually weaponised because of the Israeli military’s 
violence: 
 
The reason why these youth and children moved from flying harmless kites to flying the burning ones is 
the way Israeli forces responded since day one. People here have become aware that whether they use 
peaceful methods or not, they will always be faced with excessive force and showered with live 
ammunition; the result is always the same (Husseini 2018). 
 
Abu Mohammed Al Tayyar, nicknamed the “pilot”, is the 21-year-old “spokesperson” of the “Gaza kite 
unit”, and describes thus the reason for using the incendiary devices: “It is our only way to send a message to 
our enemy that these are our lands” (Mohanna 2018). Abu Mohammed further details the ways in which the 
incendiary kite developed:   
 
We started by flying a kite decorated with the Palestinian flag to send it to our occupied cities, then we 
developed the idea to attach rags soaked in gasoline with the tails of the kites. We will break the siege on 
Gaza even if we have to send hundreds of thousands of kites over the border (Ibid). 
 
 








Abu Mohammed’s quote demonstrates the acknowledgement that dispossession and the siege can be 
resisted by sending kites to “occupied cities.” During an April 2018 interview, another Gaza kite unit 
member stated: “not dozens but hundreds of kites will be flown toward the enemies, burning their crops, and 
causing them confusion and panic” (UNCOI 2019, 184). This quote is evocative of Fateh’s theorisation that 
sees successful anti-colonial resistance as increasing the anxiety, nervousness, and insecurity of settlers in 
order to challenge their sense of belonging to the land. Indeed, protesters involved in direct actions of 
resistance against the siege adopted a discourse and praxis that displayed the necessity to target settlers 
colonising their lands.  
Quotes from other protesters engaged in launching incendiary devices emphasise a crucial aspect of this 
tactic. While inside a tent at the protest site near Bureij - an area hosting a refugee camp in the central Gaza 
Strip - 20-year-old Abu Omar stated, “I build around 40 kites a day with the help of my friends, and we tend 
to fly all of them on the same day. I can't fly to see our occupied cities, so the kites do it instead of me, it 
makes me feel free” (Mohanna 2018). Abu Omar’s words assert his understanding of being captive in Gaza, 
being denied the right to mobility and the right to return to dispossessed lands. Further, Ayyash, also a Bureij 
kite-maker, said his teams were working hard, because the kites “raise the morale and enthusiasm of the 
youth” (Ibid). A Palestinian journalist who was embedded with balloons launchers for a day in August 2020, 
argues that because of the enormous military disadvantage “people have thus turned to other means to show 
their anger, to inflict some damage back or simply to call attention to their plight” (Abu Eltarabesh 2021). He 
further quotes a balloon launcher saying “I fire balloons because I can. I also do this to avenge my martyred 
friends” (Ibid). In these quotes there is arguably evidence of the liberating potential revealed in the active 
assertion of agency and resistance against colonial structures of oppression. The resisters’ emotions relate to 
the potential of this form of resistance to be cathartic and cleansing for the individual’s consciousness; it can 
free from despair, inaction, and restores self-respect.  
 
5. Challenging high-tech militarism? 
 
Geography played a significant role in the methods of collective action during the GRM. Rather than 
occupying squares and streets, mobilisation around the fence became the battleground between the resistance 
movement and the Israeli military. Recent anti-colonial mobilisations in the Gaza Strip have seen resistance 
techniques going underground through the building of tunnels. The underground tunnels, argues Haddad, are 
an insurgent response against “Israeli ideological, political and military doctrines”, as well as “the structured 
dependency and ineffectiveness of the Palestinian Authority” (2018, 71). With the deployment of low-tech 
aerial explosives, the air became the primary theatre of resistance operations. The post-disengagement era - 
when in 2005 Israel evacuated all settlers from the Gaza Strip - and the subsequent siege “altered the spatial 
design of Israel’s settler-colonial presence” (Dana 2020, 188). To enforce this new spatial dynamic and to 
rule from a distance, Israel relies on air power and its high-tech militarism, which constructed an electric 
fence built in 2002 that was later “equipped with technologically advanced surveillance and lethal devices” 
(Ibid, 192). Given the highly technologized spatial arrangement around the fence, the emergence of low-tech 
aerial weapons reflects this context.  
This form of resistance carried out mostly by Palestinian youths employing simple materials was a new 
challenge for which the Israeli military was not initially prepared. Rather than on the traditional battlefield, 
incendiary kites and balloons seemingly operate in a “battlespace.” This shift in terminology is used to 
denote the increasing emergence of urban warfare in contemporary conflicts, where it has become 








and Perugini 2020, 162). The kite and balloon launchers are not recognized as the canonical armed fighters 
since they are weaponising recreational objects such as toys, maintaining a non-armed status of civilian.  
This caused a debate to emerge within the higher echelons of Israel’s government and military. “There is a 
very real dilemma,” an Israeli military official said, “You can’t start a war over some balloons, but you can’t 
do nothing either” (Srivastava 2018). This “dilemma” was exemplified in the exchange reported in Israeli 
media between Israeli government minister Naftali Bennett and the IDF Chief of Staff Eizenkot. During 
discussions on how to respond to the fires caused by the youths in Gaza, Eizenkot asks, “Are you suggesting 
dropping a bomb on people flying balloons and kites?” When Bennett replies, “Yes,” Eizenkot concludes, 
“This stands against my operative and moral position” (PIC 2018). Leaving aside considerations on the 
ostensible ethics of military violence that Eizenkot alludes to, the conversation shows the potential, however 
small, inherent in the use of unconventional and nonlethal weapons such as incendiary kites and balloons to 
confront state power and cause disruption in Israeli politics. In this regard, Keysar argues that the incendiary 
kites and balloons subvert Israeli strategies of defense, confuse “its leaders and generals, and make the Israeli 
government spend millions of shekels to devise techniques and technologies that would beat the kite attack 
and bring the fires to an end” (2020, 7). 
Eventually the state mobilised its racialised war on terror discourse, branding the fires as emanating from 
“balloon terrorism”, “terror kites”, “arson terrorism,” and imparting full responsibility on Hamas for any 
confrontational action emanating from the Gaza Strip (IMFA 2018). The military’s initial retaliatory 
measures included snipers shooting at kite and balloon launchers during the protests, using air strikes as 
“warnings” against the car of a kite’s unit leader and Hamas’ military positions. It first sought to stop the 
kites and balloons through installing detectors along the fence, combined with using drones and shooting 
down the fast-moving balloons (The Telegraph 2018). After this showed mixed results, the military deployed 
the newly developed Sky Spotter system to track their trajectory and then direct firefighters to the landing 
spots. The Israeli military, in collaboration with a private security company, also created a new “smart rifle 
sight called Pegion (dagger)” which relies on electro-optic sight to intercept incendiary kites and balloons 
(Azulai 2019). The military also developed a weapon called Light Blade, or Lahav-Or in Hebrew, which 
uses an optical tracking system to spot an intrusion and firing a laser to destroy the kite or balloon (Bryen 
and Bryen 2020). Another effort consisted in using drones with razor blades attached to them and ramming 
them into the kites or balloons and using a larger drone outfitted with a claw to catch the kite or balloon in 
mid-air and down it (Surkes 2018). 
As others have noted (Halper 2016), the Israeli state is able to capitalize on counterinsurgency by 
innovating and advancing its military capability, which in turn positions it as an influential regional and 
global player among other states, extracting power and legitimacy for its settler colonialism and military 
occupation. Despite innovating on its military capabilities, these measures have been largely unsuccessful in 
preventing the attacks. As a top exporter of military equipment, often billed as “battle-tested” on 
Palestinians, the effectiveness of kites and balloons has partially undermined the narrative that portrays 
Israel’s army as one of the world’s most effective against non-state actors. If Gaza has been turned into a 
“laboratory” (see Li 2006) and a “showroom” then the failure to stop the kites and balloons cannot be used as 
PR for the sale of military equipment.  
Unable to stop the attacks, the military resorted to forms of collective punishment, which included, inter 
alia, withholding monthly Israeli transfers of tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority (Heller 2018); 
suspending fuel deliveries to the Gaza Strip and reducing Gaza’s fishing zone (Gross 2019); and blocking the 
import of helium (used to fly balloons) into Gaza (Srivastava 2018). Helium is used in hospital MRI 
(Magnetic Resonance Imaging) machines among other uses.  For Israel’s military the inability to directly 








escalation and war. Perhaps the simplicity and unpredictability of these incendiary devices has been the 
reason they have momentarily challenged one of the most technologically advanced armies in the world. 
Because the attackers are Palestinian youth, including children as young as thirteen, direct strikes would not 
be easily justifiable in the media and with international public opinion. Unlike rockets and mortars, 
incendiary kites and balloons – however destructive they may be - are not yet seen as weapons of war. They 
are also more effective at breaking the aerial blockade than rockets and mortars, since their trajectory is 
unpredictable, making a traditional military response difficult especially since they have remained nonlethal 
(Stoil 2018). From the Palestinian perspective, this low-tech form of resistance means being able to 
momentarily break the siege and confront the military. Yet, it is evident that long-term they seemingly lack 
the force to change the balance of power and potentially pressure Israel to end its siege as the kite and 
balloon launchers demand.  
 
6. Resistance against erasure from the landscape 
 
The Palestinian side of the fence that separates Gaza from Israel has been deliberately turned into an 
uncultivable area, to the detriment of farmers in Gaza. In 2010, Israel declared it a “no-go area” and has 
periodically sprayed it with herbicides since 2014 (Forensic Architecture 2019). These are the lands on 
which demonstrators began their protests in March 2018. Meanwhile on the other side of the fence Israeli 
farmers have been able to cultivate the land. The incendiary devices set fire to a considerable number of 
agricultural fields and forests surrounding Gaza. According to Israel’s Tax Authority, farmers have suffered 
more than 3 million US$ in damage, most of it from wheat crop losses (Zych 2019, 76). The fires caused 
serious loss of income, as farmers have lost everything they worked for over the course of a year. They also 
lament that it could take over two decades for restoring the fields to previous conditions. Amir Adler, who 
works in one of the kibbutz fields affected, said: “It is very imaginative, using something so low-tech, but it’s 
devastating to see the fields we’ve worked so hard to prepare totally destroyed” (Mohanna 2018). However, 
the impact was restricted by the Israeli government immediately compensating the farmers for their losses 
(Heller 2018). 
The fires, along with causing material damages, also had a psychological impact on the Israeli population. 
For instance, in the words of a local farmer, “On April 11, the first terror kite landed, and since then, my 
routine has changed radically. […] Last Friday was a total catastrophe, so many terror kites. […] It was 
horrible. They hurt us, they hurt us a lot” (KKL 2018). This type of disruption to their daily lives led to 
pressure on Israeli politicians for supposedly failing to protect the citizens’ security. The damages drove 
Israelis to start protesting against the government for not maintaining their security (Siman-Tov and 
Schweitzer 2018, 3).  
Along with crops and agricultural land, the fires significantly affected forests. In fact, the fires have 
ravaged forests that were planted on lands once the possession of Palestinians, whose descendants are now 
refugees in the Gaza Strip. Since the 1950s, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) has planted over 35,000 acres of 
forests in the Western Negev/Naqab, which surrounds the Gaza Strip (KKL 2018). Founded in 1901, the JNF 
remains a crucial parastatal institution in the hands of the Zionist movement, as it was involved in destroying 
Palestinian villages and then decided whether the land would become a new Jewish settlement or a forest. In 
this fundamental altering of the landscape in Israel/Palestine, argues Braverman (2009), tree planting became 
a central Zionist tool to settle and control. The colonisation efforts accelerated after 1948, when the JNF used 
tree planting to erase the memory and material remains of Palestinian villages destroyed by Zionist militias. 
Forests were also strategically planted in the proximity of remaining Palestinian towns to prevent their 








Planting trees over destroyed Palestinian villages is not the only way the Zionist movement attempts to 
entrench its projects of ethnic cleansing. A related process also appears in Israel’s plan after 1967 to conceal 
the destruction of Syrian villages in the occupied Golan Heights through building a ski resort on Mount 
Hermon to deliberately mimic European landscapes, specifically following the style of Swiss alps (Ram 
2013). Ram (2013, 748) finds that despite Israel’s efforts to “whiten” this mountainous region, the space 
itself posed a challenge given the unfavourable climate and topographic conditions not suitable for a ski 
resort. In addition, on one occasion Palestinian fighters from Lebanon contributed to its demise by managing 
“to infiltrate the site and detonate a handful of structures, rendering the resort inoperative for an extended 
period” (Ram 2013, 746). At the same time, the area continuously remaining in a war zone, amid military 
escalation between Israel and Syria, ultimately undermined this Zionist project of spatial mimicry.  
A similar “whitening” process of spatial mimicry was thus also implemented through afforestation, 
characteristically based on pine trees imported from Europe, in line with the overall Zionist effort to 
Europeanize Palestine (Masalha 2012, 120-134). This quote from Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, 
aptly describes the role of trees in the imagination and strategies for colonising the land: 
 
When I look out my window today and see a tree standing there, that tree gives me a greater sense of 
beauty and personal delight than all the vast forests I have seen in Switzerland or Scandinavia. Because 
every tree here was planted by us. (Ben Gurion, Memoirs9) 
 
The forests, composed of European and non-indigenous vegetation, thus serve the purpose to deny and 
erase the ethnic cleansing and destruction of Palestinian villages. By planting forests over destroyed homes 
and making it impossible to rebuild them, the JNF played a crucial role in preventing some 750,000 refugees 
from returning after 1948. The fires affecting JNF forests surrounding the Gaza Strip suddenly made the 
ruins of destroyed Palestinian villages still present on the land visible to Israelis. An Israeli photographer 
established an exhibition at the Museum of Art in the Israeli town of Herzliya, presenting images of what 
became apparent after large sections of the forests were burned. The areas that the exhibition showed include 
lands near the kibbutzim Or Haner and Gvar’am, which following the fires, revealed the ruins of the 
Palestinian villages of Simsim, Najd and Al-Mansurah. The incendiary balloons and kites made “them stand 
out; the scorched earth left behind by the fire gave them new visibility” (Reich 2019). The Palestinian 
inhabitants of these villages were forced to flee in 1948. Most became refugees in Gaza and a substantial 
number of their descendants still live in Gaza’s Jabaliya refugee camp, one of the most densely populated 
places on earth. A review of the exhibition states that the Israeli photographer’s lens “captures both the 
materiality and ghostliness of the now exposed ruins: stones on scorched earth, traces of the Nakba” 
(Johnson and Shehade 2019, 100). With incendiary kites and balloons burning JNF trees, Palestinians thus 




In going beyond Orientalist and hegemonic depictions of Palestinians as “terrorists,” this article suggests 
paying further attention to incendiary kites and balloons as a response of those resisting the violence of 
settler colonialism. While Israel’s high-tech military progressively innovates, this militant technique went 
into the opposite direction and reverted to simple - yet not unsophisticated - means. As Tawil-Souri asks, 
“instead of wishing to be an ‘equal’ player in the high-tech network […] what if Gaza embraced its low-
 








technologization?” (2021, 158). Palestinians weaponising kites and balloons represent precisely this shift to 
“low-technologisation,” which allowed them to break the siege and raise the morale and consciousness of 
resisters. Insurgent kites and balloons are a new phenomenon in the Israel/Palestine context that deserve 
further interrogation.  
This article argued that the settler colonial dispossession and military violence that Palestinians in Gaza 
face spurs them to mobilise and create new forms of resistance. The air became a suitable space for 
resistance tactics due to the siege’s physical barriers on land and the restriction of Palestinian mobility. What 
this technique reveals, is that the kites and balloons’ greatest power may lay in internally mobilising 
Palestinians to continue the resistance. These aerial explosives can be liberating for the consciousness of the 
individual, allowing for the reclamation of humanity. The low-tech character of the weapon succeeded in 
provisionally breaking the siege in a way that high-tech weapons could not. A drone attempting to fly over 
the highly surveilled buffer zone between Gaza and Israel would likely be shot down immediately (Keysar 
2020, 6). If the Great March of Return demanded an end to the siege of Gaza, the kites and balloons briefly 
enacted a suspension to it by physically crossing the Israeli imposed border. This permitted Palestinians to 
burn settlers’ properties and lands, causing some disruptions in the Israeli military and political sphere as 
they scrambled to find a solution. Lastly, by burning Jewish National Fund trees planted on ethnically 
cleansed land, this Palestinian resistance brings to light and opposes processes of erasure from the landscape.  
Attentive to the risk of romanticizing resistance the paper concludes by thinking through some important 
limitations that have emerged from the analysis. It remains questionable whether incendiary kites and 
balloons are long-term politically viable techniques of struggle. In the theorisations used by Fateh (1967) and 
Fanon (1965), the power of armed struggle discussed is much greater than the incendiary kites and balloons. 
The asymmetry is dramatically wider today than when Fanon and the Palestinian National Liberation 
Movement theorised anti-colonial resistance in the 1960s. These forms of direct action only posed a minor 
challenge to the Israeli state whose vast military superiority is very difficult to threaten. Also, the actual 
threat to Israelis has been minimal. Indeed, the violence Fanon identified that could create the “new man” 
meant that the native could do away with the coloniser. This is a goal which the incendiary kites and 
balloons seemingly cannot aspire to achieve. Fateh (1967, 2) also stressed the importance of mobilising the 
masses as crucial in the method of struggle for liberation, which incendiary kites and balloons so far haven’t 
attained given the sporadic launches and small number of those taking part in this action. These aerial 
explosives, however remarkable they have been, evidently do not have the force to bring an end to the siege 
as the launchers demand. While it is uncertain if the mobilisation of kites and balloons is sustainable going 
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